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 We need to develop a model of democratic societies that pays more attention to 
solidarity and social values - to what and how people speak, think, and feel about politics - 
than most social science theories do today. We need a theory, in other words, that is less 
myopically centered on social structure and more responsive to the ideas that people have in 
their heads and to the experiences and interactions they inform. 
 If we move from the empirical arena of social science to the normative plane of 
democratic theory, we might expect more sensitivity to such issues of intention, 
interpretation, and choice. If we do, however, we will be disappointed. Even normative 
democratic theory, it seems, is written primarily with Thracymachus in mind. It, too, focuses 
primarily on the differentiation, or pluralization, of power. Democratic theorists too often 
understand democracy merely in terms of political arrangements and narrowly defined 
institutional structures. They write about the specific patterns of sanctions and rewards that 
prevent the abuse of power and rule by the few - the separation of powers, legal rights, and 
procedural guarantees, and voting regulations.2
 Such arrangements are, indeed, of the utmost importance. They define the formal 
properties of democracy. Without the rule of the people that Aristotle described, without the 
liberal state propounded by Locke and Mill, without the dispersion of government power 
recommended by Montesquieu and Madison, there would be no democracy worth the name. 
In a world where the idea of democracy has too often been merely an ideological subterfuge 
for levelling dictatorship, we would do well to remember such formal distinctions, which can 
have such tremendous substantive effects. 
 It is no accident, then, that the virtues of this purely formal approach most recently 
have been renewed and emphasized by theorists on the post-Marxist left who are making an 
effort to save the concept and practice of socialism from the clutches of totalitarian thought. 
The most ardent and articulate Italian champion of democracy, Norberto Bobbio, uses formal 
democratic principles to extend and defend socialism. Defining democracy as majority rule in 
a liberal state, he emphasizes that "rights ... are the necessary precondition for the mainly 
                                                 
1. This essay is drawn from a book in progress, tentatively entitled Civil Society and 
Its Discontents. 
2. Robert A. Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1956) represents an early and highly influential rendering of this 
formal institutional perspective in the American context. 
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procedural mechanisms, which characterize a democratic system, to work properly," and he 
calls for such rights to enter the workplace.3 While Bobbio has defended this position through 
decades of sectarian debate, John Keane is an English post-Marxist who has emphasized the 
socialism/democracy connection more recently, defining democracy in a formal manner as "a 
differentiated and pluralistic system of power."4 Agnes Heller is the most distinguished 
contemporary follower of Lukacs, the Marxist who most famously dismissed formal 
rationality as reification. In the wake of her experiences in Hungarian society, Heller, too, has 
come to endorse a formalist position.5 In France, there is the recent writing of the long-time 
anti-Stalinist militant, Claude Lefort, who speaks about the "disentangling of the sphere of 
power, the sphere of law and the sphere of knowledge." Lefort argues that such 
differentiation rests upon an "institutional apparatus [that] prevents governments from 
appropriating power for their own ends" and guarantees that "the exercise of power is subject 
to the procedures of periodical redistributions."6
 These invocations of the formal requisites of democracy are particularly important in 
the context of the pessimistic, indeed often antagonistic attitudes toward the possibility of 
democratic society which, at least until very recently, permeated the structuralist thrust of 
critical social science. When Lefort attacks Marx's failure to understand the substantive 
effects of formal mechanisms, for example, he is attacking the sophistic discourse that has 
increasingly permeated Western critical thought under the influence of thinkers like Marcuse 
and Foucault. Marx was unable to comprehend, Lefort writes, the "recognized function of the 
written law, the status that it acquires in its separation from the sphere of power."7 The 
implicit contrast that Lefort makes between his own insistence on the differentiation of power 
and knowledge and Foucault's conflation of them is particularly important.8
 The arrangements to which these discussions refer fall under the rubric of what can be 
called structural differentiation. Yet, however important structural differentiation is, 
democracy depends on much, much more. To speak exclusively in terms of formal 
institutional mechanisms ignores the social realm that gives to independent political 
structures their most critical social support. 
 Too often the extra-political world that supports formal democratic mechanisms has 
been handled, however, simply by shifting attention from political superstructure to 
                                                 
3. Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 24. 
4. John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988), p. 3. 
5. Agnes Heller, "On Formal Democracy." In John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the 
State: New European Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 129-45. 
6. Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 19. 
7. Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
l986), pp. 252-3. 
8. Loc. cit., p. l8.  
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economic base. Materialist critics of what is pejoratively called the purely formal democracy 
of capitalist society have framed their demands for economic equality in the language of 
demands for substantive over merely formal political rights. Thus, in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, a dichotomy was erected in democratic thinking between liberal, 
formalistic approaches, on the one hand, and socialist, substantive approaches on the other. 
Marxists argued that economic equality was the only way to "realize" formal political 
promises, which they claimed had been formulated as mystifications by the ruling 
bourgeoisie. 
 Recently, as Marxism has lost its sway and the intellectual and moral understanding 
of the tragedy of state communism has matured, the contrast between formal and substantive 
rights has been posed less as a mutually exclusive dichotomy and more as a complementarity 
between two entirely different forms. For contemporary critical theory, democracy now is 
defined as formal plus substantive rights, yet the latter still is understood in primarily 
economic terms. For example, David Held has abandoned a neo-Marxist approach to justice 
and now takes up an institutional approach instead. Adding empowering economic 
"conditions" to the formal political structures of traditional democratic theory, he now 
suggests we should develop "a new model of democracy."9
 Yet, while this movement beyond the traditional Marxist critique of formal 
democracy is an important one, I want to argue here for a much broader understanding of the 
social conditions upon which democracy depends. These conditions go well beyond the 
structures of economic equality that recent neo-Marxist critics have described. The focus on 
such structures must be expanded to include a sphere of society that is relatively independent 
not only of the narrowly political but also from the economic realm. In calling this the sphere 
of "civil society," I join other contemporary social thinkers in taking up a term from the 
heyday of democratic discussion which for more than a century had fallen into disuse. I will 
define it, however, in a new way. 
 In the approach to civil society I will pursue here, I stress the significant role that 
social solidarity plays in democratic society. This emphasis, however, need not exclude 
recognition of individuality. Indeed, I wish to understand civil society as the arena in which 
social solidarity is defined in universalistic terms. It is the we-ness of a national community 
taken in the strongest possible sense, the feeling of connectedness to "every member" of that 
community that transcends particular commitments, narrow loyalties, and sectional interests. 
Only this kind of solidarity can provide a thread of identity uniting people dispersed by 
religion, class, ethnicity, or race. Only this kind of common and unifying thread, moreover, 
can allow the individuals in this group to be conceived of as themselves responsible for their 
"natural" rights. 
                                                 
9. David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 
e.g., the section "Enacting the Principle," pp. 274-7 and also pp. 183, 282, 287, 297. 
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 This conception of civil society derives from the post-Hobbesian, liberal tradition of 
political thought. That early liberal discussion was often diffuse, and the very term, civil 
society, only vaguely articulated. Still, it is to this liberal philosophical tradition that any 
contemporary discussion must return.10 To do so is to discover that, while the liberal 
understanding of civil society embraced the individual, it was far less individualistic than is 
often perceived. 
 Hobbes identified civil society with the state: "No law can be Unjust. The Law is 
made by the Sovereign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted."11 In doing 
so, Hobbes not only justified an anti-democratic form of political authority but followed a 
long tradition of pre-modern religious thought in which civil was contrasted primarily with 
ecclesiastical, as in Augustine's contrast between the city of God and the city of man. Hooker 
and Locke, by contrast, were motivated more by the individualistic activism of Reformed 
Christianity than by the hierarchical sensibilities, mechanism, and determinism that inspired 
Hobbes. In The Second Treatise on Government, Locke developed an understanding of an 
independent sphere of fellowship, a "commonwealth" or social solidarity, that emerges in the 
state of nature and is extended, via the social contract, to the civil law regulating social life. 
Locke is careful to emphasize that this solidarity is based on individuation. It is because 
"mankind [is] all equal and independent" that "no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions."12 The Scottish moralists elaborated precisely this interrelation 
of solidarity and individuation. In Adam Ferguson's response to what he considered the 
overly rationalistic individualism of contract theory, for example, he argued in Essay on the 
History of Civil Society that an increase in self-control and "subtlety," and a decrease in brute 
impulse, were necessary for the emergence of civil society; he described the latter as the 
social bond that defines a nation, the fellow-feeling among members of a community that 
guarantees respect for law, protection of property, and regulation of authority. While Adam 
Smith emphasized the role of common moral sentiments in constituting the "impartial 
spectator," he also emphasized the individualistic search of recognition and prestige that lay 
at the base of this newly civil kind of community.13 A similar attempt to connect individual 
and collective lay at the base of Tocqueville's conception of the sphere of public, active, and 
voluntary political life, the world of "self interest rightly understood" that he expressly 
anchored in the collectively binding, extra-political world of law and the collective regulation 
of religion.14  
                                                 
10. Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1993). 
11. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 388. 
12. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Book II, Section 6. 
13. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
See the important use of Smith in this regard by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot, 
De la justification (Paris: Gallimard, 1991). 
14. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 
1954). 
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 What does this early modern tradition of thinking have to do with the inadequacies of 
post-Marxist ideas about democracy? Quite a bit. As Keane has pointed out, the liberating 
discourse about civil society I have just described began to disappear in the mid-nineteenth 
century.15 Assuming the existence of solidarity and relatively equal conditions, early civil 
society theorizing emphasized liberty, guaranteeing equality only in legal and political terms. 
With the onset of industrial capitalism, this concern for political democracy became 
overshadowed by what came to be known as the social question. Pushed to intellectual center 
stage by the great working class movements of trade union organization and socialist reform, 
what Polanyi called the protectionist movement not only directed attention to the inclusion of 
economic outgroups but also re-legitimated a strong state.16 Because the state seemed 
essential for coordinating chaotic markets and for redistributing their wealth, the notion took 
hold that social equality in the industrial era could be achieved - by liberal, socialist, and 
authoritarian states alike - without any particular regard to the importance of an independent 
civic sphere. This shift in intellectual sensibility was to have extraordinary effects in real life. 
Because of it, the anti-capitalist revolutions of the twentieth century pinned their hopes for a 
good society on the strong state/social equality complex. Post-war revolutions against 
colonialism tried to construct independent socialist societies along exactly the same path. 
Only recently have the tragic social, cultural, and intellectual repercussions of these decisions 
become plain to see.  
 Meanwhile, in Western critical and Marxist theory, this shift in public and intellectual 
sensibility took on the status of an empirical fact. For thinkers from Walter Lippman and 
John Dewey to C. Wright Mills, Hannah Arendt, and Jurgen Habermas, the disappearance of 
public life became axiomatic for any consideration of twentieth century life. Captives of this 
historical shift in intellectual presuppositions, these influential thinkers were unable to think 
reflexively about it. They were convinced that capitalism had destroyed public life, that in 
democratic mass societies an all-powerful market had pulverized social bonds, converted 
citizens into egoists, and allowed oligarchies and bureaucracies full sway. Capitalism was 
conceived as the world in which privacy ruled. That this was in fact far from the case had 
become for even the most acute social observers very difficult to see. They could no longer 
draw upon the idea of civil society, and the social conditions that had triggered its demise 
still held sway. 
 During the period when industrial capitalism first emerged, Marx had laid the basis 
for this view of modern decline by identifying civil society exclusively with the formally-
                                                 
15. John Keane, "Remembering the Dead: Civil Society and the State from Hobbes 
to Marx and Beyond," in Democracy and Civil Society, loc. cit., pp. 31-68, and 
"Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction 
Between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850," in John Keane (ed.), Civil Society 
and the State, loc. cit., pp. 35-71. 
16. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 
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guaranteed realm of capitalist economics. As Cohen writes in her devastating critique, 
"social, political, private, and legal institutions were treated [by Marx] as the environment of 
the capitalist system, to be transformed by its logic but without a dynamism of their own."17 
Marx had accused Hegel of justifying such a privatized conception of civil society, of 
identifying it only with the "system of needs" which became the world of political-economy 
in Marx's own work. It comes as a surprise to most contemporary readers that Hegel had 
never done any such thing. To the contrary, his work can be seen as having reworked the 
liberal line of thought in a more communal, solidaristic way. It is true that the available 
linguistic resources and the peculiarities of German history led Hegel, as it had led Kant, to 
translate the English term, "civil society," as Burgerlich Gesellschaft, which roughly means 
"bourgeois" or "middle class" society. Nonetheless, the Marxist contention that Hegel 
identified civil society simply with class society is not only anachronistic, but fundamentally 
misleading. For Hegel, civil society is not only the world of economic needs but also the 
sphere of ethics. It is a moral realm differentiated from family life, which Hegel portrayed as 
fully concrete and particularistic, and from the state, an institution that for ideological and 
philosophical reasons Hegel considered the only fully universalist realm. What is important is 
that, alongside the world of needs, Hegel emphasized other intermediate groupings and 
forms, like law and what today we would call voluntary organizations.18
 Indeed, it was at least in part under Hegel's influence that Antonio Gramsci developed 
his own, thoroughly anti-individualistic and anti-economistic approach to civil society, which 
despite its Marxist allegiance has done more to resuscitate the fuller conception than any 
other approach in our time. Departing from Marxist dualism, Gramsci defined civil society as 
the realm of political, cultural, legal, and public life that occupied an intermediate zone 
between economic relations and political power.19 On the basis of this thoroughly anti-
reductionistic idea, he issued a profound challenge to orthodox Marxist thought, maintaining 
that socialist revolution could not be triggered by a crisis in the economy alone. Civil society 
itself would have to be challenged, and transformed, independently of the economic base. 
                                                 
17. Loc. cit., pp. 5, 24. 
18. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Third Part, Second Section. Note Jean Cohen and 
Andrew Arato's discussions of Hegel and civil society, especially in their Civil 
Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). But Hegel is 
perhaps quite not as original as they or the other authors who have rightly tried to re-
emphasize his positive contributions to the newly emerging discussion of civil 
society, e.g., the claims of A.Z. Pelczynski, The State and Civil Society: Studies in 
Hegel's Political Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Manfred 
Reidel, Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1984). These treatments underplay the 
Scottish and British origins of thinking about the term.  
19. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. 
and trans. by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1971). 
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Despite the fact that Gramsci did not associate civil society with democracy, but rather with 
the world that impeded it, his discussion is highly significant for the conception I would like 
to develop here.  
 That Gramsci was forced to develop his thinking about civil society in a Fascist 
prison was not only his misfortune but our own. If his ideas about civil society had been able 
to affect broader intellectual life, they may have helped to prevent this virtual disappearance 
of the term from social scientific thought. Still, the substantive phenomena to which the term 
refers have continued to be the focus of important strands of twentieth century social 
scientific thought. Notions of solidarity, civilization, civility, and citizenship have been 
central to important lines of theoretical and empirical work. Durkheim devoted his career to 
outlining the mechanisms and processes of social solidarity. Freud conceived his 
psychological studies as part of a broader investigation into the nature of civilization, which 
he saw as dependent upon the successful sublimation that produced pacific and cooperative 
social behavior. Mead understood the "generalized other" as an internal mechanism that 
allowed mutual understanding and rule-regulated action, which in turn allowed the kind of 
spontaneous cooperation and play that interaction in a democracy suggests. Piaget explained 
the psycho-social processes that generated altruistic and communal, yet at the same time 
individuated modes of thought and action. Marshall defined social citizenship as dependent 
not only upon a strong state but upon the spread of mutual sympathy and cross-class 
solidarity. Parsons developed his notion of societal community to identify a sphere of social 
solidarity based upon individual rights, which could interpenetrate with the political, 
economic, and cultural realms. 
 With the exception of Freud, however, these discussions suffered from their 
participation in the utopian project of modernization. The civilizing projects that each thinker 
identified were viewed as immanent ones. The tensions that existed between these civilizing 
processes and the uncivil spheres of society were drastically underemphasized, and the dark 
and destabilizing underside of civil society were often ignored. In this way, and despite their 
enormous contributions, these more positive and appreciative openings to civil society 
formed the mirror image of the critical denial of it. 
 Nonetheless, conceived as a form of social organization distinct from economic and 
political categories, and which refers to collective solidarity and individual voluntarism at the 
same time, civil society can be seen as a uniquely sociological concept, as Alvin Gouldner 
argued some twenty years ago in his profoundly prescient defense of the concept against 
Marxist forms of critical theory.20 Civil society does not imply community in a narrow, 
traditionalistic sense, the sense that is emphasized, for example, in the classical sociological 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, typically translated as community and 
                                                 
20. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms (New York: Seabury, 1980). This 
postscript never received sufficient attention because it was published during the 
period of strong state theory. 
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society, or in recent examples of communitarian social philosophy. The approach I wish to 
take here, to the contrary, might be described as suggesting the "community of society," the 
Gesellschaft as a Gemeinschaft. Every functioning group needs to have some collective 
consciousness.21 "Civil" society is understood as that form of collective consciousness which 
extends most widely and deeply, so much so that it can in principle include all the various 
groupings in a discrete, administratively regulated, territorial domain.22 Identification over 
such a widely dispersed space can be sustained only by universalistic ties that appeal to 
highly generalized values like rights and peoplehood. 
 The breadth and scope of such a community has led most contemporary thinking 
about civil society to follow Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers in their 
identification of such ties by terms such as reason and abstract right. Habermas and those 
influenced by him effectively limit the actual discourse of civil society to references to 
reasonableness, rights, and fairness as such. In so doing, they tie their thinking about the 
processes of civil society to the classical ideal of a completely transparent communication.23 
Similar strains of abstract universalism permeate John Rawls' theory of justice, which is 
postulated on the notion that political systems will become more civil and inclusive only if 
political actors can engage in hypothetical thought experiments where they must develop 
distributive principles without any concrete knowledge of their own particular fates.24 The 
critical terms of Parsons' evolutionary theory, value generalization and instrumental activism, 
reveal the same kind of commitment to an abstract and contentless, procedural notion of 
overarching rationality.25
                                                 
21. For the most intriguing recent elaboration of this Durkheimian idea, see Edward 
Shils' recent work on community self-consciousness: "The Virtue of Civil Society," 
Government and Opposition 26 (1991): 3-20; "Civility and Civil Society" in Edward 
Banfield ed., Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies (Professors 
World Peace Academcy, 1991). 
22. See my earlier discussion of the "terminal community" of society. Jeffrey C. 
Alexander, "Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation," in 
Alexander, Action and Its Environments (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), pp. 78-106. 
23. For the exclusive identification of reason with civil society and the public sphere, 
see Jurgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Polity Press, 
1989); for the idea of complete transparency, see Jurgen Habermas, Theory of 
Communicative Action (Polity Press, 1984-87). For the work of Habermas' most 
original and important followers in this regard, see Cohen and Arato, Civil Society 
and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). For my critique of Habermas's 
position, see J. Alexander, "Habermas and Critical Theory: Beyond the Marxian 
Dilemma?" in J. Alexander, Structure and Meaning (Columbia University Press, 
1989), pp. 217-49. For my critique of Cohen and Arato in this regard, see Alexander, 
"The Return of Civil Society," Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 23 (Jan. 1994). 
24. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press, 1972). 
25. Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 
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 Universalistic ties, however, need not be socially articulated by abstract symbols like 
"reason" or "right." Of course, they can be, and often are, as in such foundational documents 
as the American "Declaration of Independence" or the French "Declaration of the Rights of 
Man." But to limit our thinking about civil society to such notions commits what might be 
called the fallacy of misplaced abstractness, a fallacy that undermines the very sociological 
usefulness of the term. Universalism is most often articulated in concrete rather than abstract 
language. Evoking immanent tendencies in particular local, national, or even civilizational 
cultures, universalism appeals to images, metaphors, myths, and codes, anchoring these 
symbolic categories to the everyday lifeworlds within which citizens reside.26 For the French 
revolutionary sans-coulettes, as for the American revolutionaries, the emerging civil society 
was not something abstract. For the French, it was the "beloved nation," often portrayed 
iconically as a woman, "Marie," the goddess of liberty. For the Americans, reason was 
metaphorically conceived in the narratives of Old Testament religiosity, and iconographically 
in such symbols as the liberty tree. For contemporary Americans intent on enlarging civil 
society, the concrete imaginings of a more civil, and hence universalistic, solidarity have 
even taken a specifically racial hue, as the multicultural language about a "rainbow" society 
suggests. 
 As these cultural considerations suggest, the abstraction that has dominated so much 
of the recent thinking about the discourse of civil society must be brought down to earth and 
translated into terms of realistic, concrete, everyday thought and speech. Abstractly 
universalistic understandings of the institutional reach of civil society must be challenged in 
the same way. Because nation-states continue to be the limiting structures of contemporary 
social life, civil consciousness can be impersonal only in a relative sense. There is no 
principled reason, to be sure, why the concept of civil society cannot be applied to the 
supranational plane. As the mushrooming influence of international demands for human 
                                                 
26. In Les Puissances de l'experience (1992), his remarkable effort to reconstruct 
Habermas's communicative theory by linking it to hermeneutic theories of narrative 
and interpretation, Jean-Marc Ferry seems to be making a very similar point. Its 
usefulness is limited, however, by his insistence on an evolutionary sequence of forms 
of experience that places narrative first in history and rational reconstruction in the 
most recent position. See Philip Smith's critique, from a more cultural position, in 
Contemporary Sociology, forthcoming. In contrast, I am suggesting a position that is 
very similar to that of Michael Walzer, who has insisted in a series of books that both 
the lay and professional understanding of justice can arise only immanently, from 
within particular spatial and cultural domains. See also the very important argument 
of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot, in De la Justification (1991), that there is a 
plurality of discursive regimes, each of which organizes the understanding of justice, 
and none of which evokes the standard of abstract rationality. There remain, however, 
noncultural, radically universalistic tendencies in their work, as evidence, for 
example, in their sharp critique of Walzer for insisting that the regulating principles 
of different social spheres are culturally and historically relative and require, 
therefore, an hermeneutical rather than a purely analytic approach. 
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rights makes evident, an imminently global civil solidarity has indeed become a factor on the 
contemporary world scene. It is certainly the case, as well, that national states have begun to 
cede some of their institutional power to supra-national forces, particularly in the economic 
realm. Nonetheless, national states continue to form the effective boundaries of the societal 
community, and it is typically a national version of solidary ties that defines the rights and 
duties of those who are its members and determines inclusion and exclusion as a result. 
 We must continue, in other words, to discuss civil society as a community roughly 
isomorphic with the nation. That "nation" connotes solidarity and identity demonstrates that 
by no means can it be equated with the state; at the same time, the concrete and rooted 
quality of every nation suggests a particularity that challenges the abstraction of the 
normative idea of civil society, relativizing its philosophical universalism in a sociological 
way. At this point in historical development, the binding collectivity, for better and for 
worse, understands itself primarily in terms of the history, high culture, and local narratives 
of a distinctively national existence. Yet, while the concrete reference of the collective 
dimension of civic consciousness suggests the community of the nation, universalism retains 
clear supra-national implications. When it is linked to civil consciousness, then, nationalism 
can be defined in a manner that allows increasing recognition of individual autonomy. The 
expansion and contraction of the state, studied over centuries or over much shorter periods of 
time, involves not only political, economic, religious, and organizational power, but the 
construction and reconstruction of the national community as a more and less civil society. 
Restrictive understandings of national solidarity have been challenged, and successfully 
redefined in broader and more civil ways, by those excluded from "the nation" and by those 
intellectuals and social movement leaders who have spoken in their name. At the same time, 
this halting and uneven process has often been blocked and powerfully reversed. Even when 
the struggle for inclusion is successful, moreover, it can typically expand universalism within 
the nation only by reinforcing particularistic orientations without, which define the nation not 
only as a distinctive but, indeed, as a superior community vis-a-vis others. Despite its overly 
economistic form, it was just such a dialectic that Engels had in mind when he contended that 
the newly gained affluence and inclusion of skilled workers in nineteenth century Britain 
made them support imperialist politics. It has often been by proving themselves to be "good 
Americans," for example by fighting courageously in American wars, that racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities have earned entrance into the civil society of the United States. Marshall 
suggested that the British Welfare State, which marked a significant expansion of civil 
society, owed its creation to the cross-class solidarity that emerged among the British soldiers 
in World War II.27
 Within the context of the nation-state, however, the process of expanding civil society 
                                                 
27. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge Unviersity Press, 
1950). 
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refers not only to horizontally extending its scope - the inclusion of outgroups - but also to a 
vertical process which allows a fuller realization of the "higher" obligations that such 
communities engage, commitments that can be conceived of as transcendent vis-a-vis 
existing institutions and which may relativize and challenge the moral status of the national 
collectivity at a particular point in historical time. This transcendental anchoring may connect 
to the metaphysical dualism of revealed religion, as Bellah's notion of the American civil 
religion suggests;28 but it can also, however, be more naturalistically and ethically conceived. 
Whatever its form, this transcendental reference allows the national community to be 
conceived not merely as a primordial community based on inherited givens but as an 
association based upon reason and virtue, qualities which can be seen as much more widely 
distributed and achieved.29 If the collective side of civil society is represented by nationalistic 
rhetoric about "God's chosen people" and by constraints on unpatriotic public behavior, its 
individualistic side is represented by highly idealized discourses that illustrate rights, virtues, 
reasons, and freedoms, and which imagine relationships built upon spontaneous solidarity.30
 Civil society, then, is paradoxical, a dimension of social organization rooted 
simultaneously in a radical individualization and a thorough-going collectivism, the 
combination captured in Habermas's notion of "the sphere of private people come together as 
a public."31 For such an expansive solidarity to be maintained, subjective commitments must 
be made to the national group as a whole. "We, the people ..." is more than an historically 
specific phrase in the opening sentence of the American Constitution: it is a language that 
permeates and helps to constitute the "civil" in every struggle over solidarity and society. Yet 
if solidarity were extended only to the collectivity as such it would become a particularism 
supporting repression, not liberty. Communist states are no less committed than democratic 
ones to the idea of "the people." By understanding civil solidarity only in its purely collective 
sense, totalitarian forms justify their governments as "people's democracies."32 In his 
reflections on the social dimensions of modern citizenship, Marshall underscored the 
fundamental importance of complementing the collective, communal component of civil 
society with the institutionalized protection of individuals.33 Distinguishing "Socialism II," 
exemplified by the postwar British welfare state, from "Socialism I," the Bolshevik's 
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communist model, he emphasized the former's insistence that welfare be distributed on the 
basis of particular rights and obligations rather than merely collective membership in the 
national group. The tension-in-balance later became the starting point for Reinhard Bendix's 
explorations of the contemporary political development of citizenship and of Parsons' 
analytical theorizing about the societal community.34
 The tension between the individual and collective dimensions of civil solidarity has 
often been recognized by political actors themselves. The leaders of the Solidarity movement 
in Poland, for example, believed that their movement had created the communal, or 
collective, basis for a civil society. As they prepared for the transition to democratic politics, 
however, they became acutely aware that this dimension of collective solidarity did not 
necessarily imply the respect for individual rights and pluralism that constitutes civil society's 
other, more liberal side. In the midst of that transition, during an academic conference on 
civil society during the Polish transition to democracy, Bronislaw Geremek, Solidarity's 
parliamentary leader, told his colleagues "we don't need to define" the communal aspects of 
Polish civil society: "We see it and feel it." He added, however, that this solidarity was "not 
yet democracy." In this sense, he concluded, Poland's fledgling civil society was still "the 
opposite of the West's," which also had a decidedly individual side.35
 If the philosophical nature of current discussions about civil society makes it difficult 
to see the particularizing limits that sociological exigencies put on its universal ideas, it also 
makes it difficult to see where the boundaries of civil society and those of other institutions 
begin. In the early modern formulations upon which so much of current discussion depends, 
civil society was an umbrella concept that, in one usage or another, included everything 
outside the control of the state, from the family, to economic corporations, to the law and 
voluntary organizations. In the transition from early modern Absolutism to the first 
democratic revolutions, of course, there were good historical-practical reasons for such a 
broad usage. Much the same can be said for the employment of this broad conception in the 
current effort to free nonpolitical spheres from state and party control in former Communist 
and authoritarian countries today. In the heat of electing the first non-Communist prime 
minister in postwar Poland, for example, a New York Times columnist argued that, while 
"modern society requires specialists" - the differentiation of interests and objectives - "it also 
needs to harmonize the citizens' efforts. Totalitarianism destroys all associations it cannot 
dominate. So civil society needs a constant organizing."36
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 Yet, no matter how historically appropriate or politically relevant, the very breadth of 
this conceptualization creates theoretical confusion and practical disarray. Because it offers 
only one principle for civil society, that of "nonstate," it conflates institutions and processes - 
public and familial, economic and solidaristic, corporate and voluntary - that are often 
divergent and contradictory.37 In Democracy and Civil Society, for example, Keane defines 
civil society as "the realm of social ... activities" defined so broadly as to include "privately 
owned," "market-directed," "voluntarily run," and "friendship-based" organizations, a series 
of phenomena which are by no means necessarily theoretically complementarity or 
practically congenial. Keane goes on to assert, moreover, that such civil activities are at once 
"legally recognized" and "guaranteed by the state," all the while forming an "autonomous 
[sphere of] social life." Still later he describes civil society as "an aggregate of institutions 
whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities - economic and 
cultural production, household life and voluntary association" and goes on to identify these 
seemingly private activities as "'sociable' public spheres."38
 Similarly, when Andrew Arato first employed "civil society" in a series of important 
articles on the Polish Solidarity movement in the early l980s, he suggested that the civil 
sphere in its Western form was tied to private property, a traditional understanding that not 
only contradicts the broad range of references employed by Keane but also renders the 
concept much less useful for distinguishing democratic from nondemocratic capitalist 
societies.39 In their later philosophical statement on the topic, Cohen and Arato expressly 
severed this connection. Yet, their much more differentiated model still failed to differentiate 
civil society from the spheres of ideological and religious life. 
 In Held's embrace of this overly inclusive approach, he argues that "there is a 
profound sense ... in which civil society can never be 'separate' from the state." Because the 
latter "provide[s] the overall legal framework of society, to a significant degree [it] 
constitutes the former."40 The problem here lies with just what the term separate means. In 
national communities, state bureaucracies monopolize the means of violence; in this sense, 
the legal and civil order must indeed, be connected to the state. Yet the specificity of the legal 
order, the formulation of laws, the interpretation of constitutions, and the legal judgment of 
other institutions in terms of civil criteria may in fact be sharply differentiated from the very 
state institutions that underwrite their force. Independently grounded and interpreted law may 
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control the state's exercise of violence. To suggest a distinction between direct and indirect 
state control, as Held does, will not resolve this problem. To the degree that civil society is 
independent, it will control the state, not be indirectly controlled by it.  
 Such confusions continue to inform even the most useful of the recent discussions, 
which continue to draw upon early modern discussions of civil society and from the common 
sense thinking of political actors today. Alan Wolfe identifies civil society with the private 
sphere of family and voluntary organization.41 Adam Seligman ties it to the rule of reason in 
a highly abstract sense.42 Pateman claims civil society to be inextricably linked to patriarchal 
family relations, while other critical intellectuals identify it with particular economic 
structures of inequality.43 In recent essays by Shils and Walzer the concept assumes, once 
again, its older, ambiguous, umbrella-like form.44 Others continue to identify civil society 
with the state, Ahrne viewing this connection as a continuing source for social equality, 
Kimmerling seeing it as a barely concealed threat to democracy.45 Cohen and Arato's 
systematic treatise is certainly the most nuanced of all these recent works, but by identifying 
civil society with the entirety of social life that lies outside the economy, the state, and the 
family, they agglomerate various institutions and cultural patterns that must be much more 
carefully kept distinct. 
 These problems demonstrate the lack of precision in the contemporary usage of civil 
society. We need a more delimited and differentiated understanding of the term, one which 
can parallel the empirical demarcation of civil society that democracy in the ideal sense 
implies. Archaic uses must be discarded. The courts, the police, the market, private property 
interests, the family, the religious and philosophical spheres - each has its specific and 
independent nonpolitical interests, which are as different from those of civil society, the 
sphere of universalizing social solidarity, as they are themselves different from the state's. 
 This is not to say that these nonpolitical spheres, or indeed the state itself, can be 
hermetically separated from civil society. To the contrary, only by separating these spheres 
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analytically - defining them according to independent concepts and pinpointing their 
differentiated interests and discourses - can we understand the actions that social movements, 
elites, and ordinary persons alike undertake to reconstruct them. Only with this analytical 
move, in other words, can we trace the empirical interrelations between civil society and 
these other, noncivil spheres. Walzer and Boltanski and Thevenot have argued, quite rightly, 
that these other, noncivil arenas are spheres of justice in their own right.46 Their non-civil 
status does not mean they should be conceived as spheres of pure interest or egoism: they 
have immanent moral structures in their own right. Yet these other "regimes of justification," 
nonetheless, differ in fundamental ways from justifications by reference to "the common 
good," the criteria that most approximates the criteria of civil society itself. The institutions, 
interactions, and values that underlay civil solidarity depart in clear ways from those that 
underlay the world of economic cooperation and competition, the affectual and intimate 
relations of family life, and the transcendental and abstract symbolism that form the media of 
exchange in religious and intellectual life. 
 Civil solidarity may well be a necessary, if not a sufficient condition for these other 
social functions to be carried out in a democratic way. For this reason, civil and noncivil 
spheres cannot merely co-exist in a kind of harmonious interchange. It is not only the 
pluralization of spheres that guarantees a good society, as Walzer suggests, nor the free play 
and good will of interlocutors willing to compromise their interests in the face of competing 
and persuasive claims for moral justification, as Boltanski and Thevenot propose. To 
maintain democracy, it is often necessary for civil society to "invade" the other noncivil 
spheres, to demand certain kinds of reform and response, and to monitor them through 
regulation in turn. In response to what might be called "destructive intrusions" into the civil 
realm, civil society makes efforts at "repair." 
 In functionalist terms, civil society can be conceived as a social dimension, or 
subsystem, that receives inputs from these other spheres, is bound by their constraints, and 
makes efforts to constrain them in turn. In a more phenomenological sense, it can be said that 
civil society constructs some of the basic, taken for granted assumptions upon which 
activities in these other spheres rely. Indeed, it constitutes a large part of the public lifeworld 
upon which the social organization of contemporary society rests. 
 Persons can be members of civil society and participants in differentiated social 
institutions at the same time. When people participate in the corporation, the state, the 
church, and the family, if they are citizens they do so also as members of a civil society. 
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Because of such dual membership, participants in these discrete and more particularistic 
institutions are connected to persons, experiences, norms, and sanctions outside of their 
specific spheres. Only to the degree that a more universalistic, civil solidarity holds are 
"persons" as such guaranteed rights and committed to obligations, rights and obligations that 
can and often do contend with the more restrictive opportunities and constraints which they 
experience in the other spheres of their lives, at work, at home, or the neighborhood. 
 
 
 
